CPU-Z and HWMonitor After the CPUID Breach: What Happened and How to Check Your Download

By Updated Checked against official sources on 16 Nov 2026

Short answer: Yes, cpuid.com is safe to use again, and it is the only official source for CPU-Z and HWMonitor. In April 2026 attackers changed the download links on cpuid.com so that they pointed to malware. Kaspersky puts the window at about 9 April 2026, 15:00 UTC, to 10 April 2026, 10:00 UTC. CPUID told BleepingComputer it lasted about six hours and that its signed original files were not touched. The affected builds were CPU-Z 2.19, HWMonitor 1.63, HWMonitor Pro 1.57 and PerfMonitor 2.04. If you downloaded one of them in that window, treat the PC as possibly compromised. For any copy, compare its SHA-256 with CPUID's own checksum list.

Official-source review — 8 November 2026 UTC: We checked cpuid.com, the CPU-Z and HWMonitor pages, CPUID's download pages and its published SHA-256 checksum list, Kaspersky's Securelist report, BleepingComputer's report with CPUID's statement, Rescana's incident write-up and the CVE record for CVE-2017-15303. On 8 November 2026 at 12:01 UTC we downloaded cpu-z_3.02-en.exe (4,860,104 bytes) and hwmonitor_1.68.exe (3,648,736 bytes) from download.cpuid.com, which is where cpuid.com's own download buttons point. We did not run them. Their SHA-256 values matched CPUID's checksum list, and Windows reported both as validly signed by CPUID, with a certificate issued by Sectigo. We did not obtain, run or analyse any of the malicious files. Everything we say about them comes from the reports linked below.

What happened to the CPUID website in April 2026?

Attackers did not change CPU-Z or HWMonitor themselves. They changed where the download buttons on cpuid.com sent people. Kaspersky's researchers wrote that the "legitimate download URLs" for the installers were replaced with links to malicious sites (Securelist, 10 April 2026, updated 16 April).

A CPUID spokesperson explained it to BleepingComputer. They said a "secondary feature (basically a side API)" was compromised. They also said the signed original files were not compromised, and that the breach was found and fixed. According to the same report, the attack happened while CPUID's main developer was on holiday.

Users noticed something was wrong because the download link fetched a file named like HWiNFO, a tool from a different developer. BleepingComputer reported that it opened a Russian-language installer built with Inno Setup, which CPUID does not normally use.

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Which CPU-Z and HWMonitor downloads were affected, and when?

Two sources give two different lengths for the window. We report both, because we cannot check which is right.

  • Kaspersky: from about 9 April 2026, 15:00 UTC, until about 10 April 2026, 10:00 UTC.
  • CPUID's spokesperson: about six hours between 9 and 10 April 2026.

Kaspersky listed these products and versions, with example names of the malicious files:

ProductVersionMalicious file names reported by Kaspersky
CPU-Z2.19cpu-z_2.19-en.zip
HWMonitor1.63hwmonitor_1.63.zip, hwinfo_monitor_setup.exe
HWMonitor Pro1.57hwmonitor-pro_1.57.zip, HWMonitorPro_1.57_Setup.exe
PerfMonitor 22.04perfmonitor-2_2.04.zip, PerfMonitor2_Setup.exe

Note that some of these names look exactly like CPUID's real file names. So the file name alone does not tell you whether a copy is safe. The hash does.

Kaspersky said its telemetry found more than 150 victims, most of them private individuals. Some organisations in retail, manufacturing, consulting, telecommunications and agriculture were also hit. Most infections were in Brazil, Russia and China.

What did the fake CPU-Z and HWMonitor installers do?

According to Kaspersky, each fake package contained the real, signed CPUID program plus a malicious DLL named CRYPTBASE.dll. When the real program started, Windows loaded the fake DLL from the same folder. This trick is called DLL sideloading.

The DLL checked whether it was running in a sandbox, then contacted a command-and-control server. The final payload was a remote access trojan that Kaspersky identified as STX RAT. Rescana's write-up describes the last stage as an information stealer that targeted passwords saved in browsers.

This detail matters for checking files. The CPUID program inside a fake ZIP could still show a valid CPUID signature. The danger was the extra DLL next to it. A valid signature on one file does not prove the whole folder is clean.

How is the CPUID attack linked to the fake FileZilla campaign?

Kaspersky wrote that the attackers "reused both the C2 address and the connection configuration" from an earlier campaign in March 2026. That earlier campaign used a fake FileZilla website. BleepingComputer also reported this link, citing a researcher shared by vx-underground. Rescana says the same group is believed to have targeted FileZilla users in March 2026, but also notes that no specific threat actor has been publicly named.

Kaspersky called the attack on cpuid.com "orchestrated quite poorly". Reusing the same infrastructure is what let security tools spot it soon after it began.

The lesson is the same for both programs. Attackers copy well-known free tools because people search for them and trust them. Our guide to fake download sites explains the usual patterns, and you can paste a link into our download site checker before you download.

Is it safe to download CPU-Z and HWMonitor from cpuid.com now?

CPUID told BleepingComputer the breach was fixed, and the site now serves the normal files. Our own check on 8 November 2026 agrees with that for the two installers we downloaded.

During the attack, links pointed to other hosts. Kaspersky named them: cahayailmukreatif[.]web[.]id, transitopalermo[.]com, vatrobran[.]hr and an r2[.]dev address. If your browser's download history shows a CPU-Z or HWMonitor file from any of these, treat it as malicious.

cpuid.com showed no security notice about the incident when we checked it on 8 November 2026.

How do I check a CPU-Z or HWMonitor installer's SHA-256 and signature?

Do two checks. The hash proves the file is the exact one CPUID published. The signature shows who signed it.

1. Check the SHA-256 hash. Open PowerShell in your Downloads folder and run:

Get-FileHash .\cpu-z_3.02-en.exe -Algorithm SHA256

Find the same file name in CPUID's checksum.txt and compare every character. You can also drop the file into our SHA-256 checker, which hashes it in your browser. These are the values we measured, and they match CPUID's list:

FileSizeSHA-256 (measured 8 Nov 2026, matches CPUID)
cpu-z_3.02-en.exe4,860,104 bytes7109edaeffddd39b75d170d5465263185cc80103f37f49065709e91ddcecee8d
hwmonitor_1.68.exe3,648,736 bytesfae15460133a648caca1a63fd809ef0b042cf82daf73c239fa5ac7b062cb2b16

CPUID's list also includes older builds. For example, it lists the genuine hwmonitor_1.63.exe, hwmonitor_1.63.zip, hwmonitor-pro_1.57.exe and hwmonitor-pro_1.57.zip. If you kept one of those from April, its hash must match the list exactly. CPU-Z 2.19 was not in the list when we checked, because it starts at 2.20.

2. Check the digital signature. Run:

Get-AuthenticodeSignature .\cpu-z_3.02-en.exe | Format-List Status, SignerCertificate

On both files we tested, the status was Valid. The signer was CN=CPUID, O=CPUID, located in Nord, France. The issuer was Sectigo Public Code Signing CA EV R36. You can see the same details by right-clicking the file, choosing Properties and opening the Digital Signatures tab. Our guide on how to check a Windows installer's digital signature walks through both methods.

3. If you have a ZIP, look inside it. Kaspersky's fake ZIPs held a real signed program plus CRYPTBASE.dll. A genuine Windows cryptbase.dll lives in System32 or SysWOW64, not in a program folder. If you find one next to the CPU-Z or HWMonitor program file, do not run anything in that folder.

Our study of Windows installer checksums explains why few publishers post hashes at all. CPUID is one of the publishers that does.

What should I do if I downloaded CPU-Z or HWMonitor on 9 or 10 April 2026?

These steps are based on Kaspersky's and Rescana's recommendations, plus the hash check above.

  1. Check the file's SHA-256 against CPUID's list. If it does not match, or the file is not on the list, treat it as malicious.
  2. If you ran a file that does not match, disconnect the PC from the network.
  3. Look for CRYPTBASE.dll in the folder where you unpacked or installed the program.
  4. Run a full scan with up-to-date security software.
  5. From a different, clean device, change the passwords saved in your browsers on that PC. Turn on two-factor sign-in where you can. Rescana says to treat those credentials as exposed.
  6. For a work PC, tell your IT team. Kaspersky's report lists file hashes and domains they can search for.
  7. Install the current version again from cpuid.com and check the hash first.

If you downloaded CPU-Z or HWMonitor before 9 April or after 10 April 2026, from cpuid.com, the reports do not suggest a problem. A hash check against CPUID's list will still confirm it.

Do CPU-Z and HWMonitor use the WinRing0 driver?

We could not confirm that they do. CPUID's own pages do not mention WinRing0. Some third-party blogs say HWMonitor uses it, but we found no statement from CPUID or a security vendor that backs this up. So we do not repeat it as fact.

What is documented is that CPU-Z uses its own kernel driver, and that driver has had a flaw before. The CVE-2017-15303 record, published in October 2017, says CPU-Z before 1.43 let any local program write to arbitrary memory through its kernel-mode driver, for example cpuz141_x64.sys. Separately, CPUID's own changelog for CPU-Z 2.19 says it fixed a "DLL hijacking vulnerability".

Neither of these is related to the April 2026 attack. That attack was about swapped download links, not a driver. If Windows Security has warned you about WinRing0 from a fan-control or RGB tool, see our WinRing0 vulnerable driver guide. For FanControl in particular, see is FanControl safe and its official download page.

What this page does not do

We did not analyse the malware. We did not test the old CPU-Z 2.19 or HWMonitor 1.63 builds, and we cannot tell you whether a specific PC was infected. We do not offer CPU-Z or HWMonitor files. Every download link here goes to cpuid.com. We are not saying CPU-Z or HWMonitor are unsafe today. Other monitoring tools have their own official sources. For example, see our MSI Afterburner page.

Questions

Was CPU-Z itself hacked?

No. CPUID said its signed original files were not compromised. The attackers changed download links on cpuid.com for a short time.

Is HWiNFO_Monitor_Setup.exe from CPUID?

No. CPUID does not make HWiNFO. Reports say a file with this kind of name was the fake installer served during the attack. Delete it and do not run it.

Does a valid CPUID signature mean my download is safe?

Not on its own. The fake ZIPs held a real signed CPUID program next to a malicious DLL. Check the hash against CPUID's checksum list too.

Where does CPUID publish its hashes?

At download.cpuid.com/checksum.txt. CPUID's download page links to it.

Sources

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